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The Challenges of Investigating Section 5K1.1 In Practice

familiar with the sentencing guidelines has
rom
recognized
the verythat
beginning,
almost
everyone
substantial
assistance
motions
pose a severe threat to the goal of horizontal equity in
sentencing. The problem stems in part from the fact
that any scheme using sentencing leniency to reward
cooperation reduces the likelihood that two defendants of similar culpability and criminal history will
receive the same sentence if one cooperates and the
other doesn't. The damage, however, is potentially
magnified by the particular system established by the
federal guidelines: The absence of clear guidelines as
to how cooperators should be treated makes it likely
that the same two defendants will not receive like
treatment even if both render the same degree of
assistance to the government.
Threatened damage does not always come to pass,
however. After a decade of guideline sentencing, one
would like to be able to answer the most basic
questions about this threat to a central goal of the
Sentencing Reform Act: (i) To what extent has 5KI.I
actually resulted in inequities?, and (2) If inequities
have indeed resulted, what can be done about them?
In this regard, one can only welcome the efforts
of the Sentencing Commission's staff to go beyond
supposition and anecdote' and provide a quantative
and, where that is impossible, a qualitative picture of
how S 5KI.i is working. Both the initial report of the
Substantial Assistance Staff Working Group and the
subsequent staff report by Linda Drazga Maxfield and
John H. Kramer are models of what sentencing
research should be. They ask the right questions.
They gather appropriate data and present it clearly.
And, perhaps most importantly, they are quite careful
to identify the limits of their presentations. The
Working Group's multivariate analysis thus takes
pains to point out: "Variables that were not available
for analysis likely have strong explanatory impacts on
the substantial assistance process: the amount of
cooperation, the quality or usefulness of the information, the charging policies of law enforcement, and
the plea bargaining practices of the prosecution." 2
The chief conclusion of the Maxfield-Kramer report is
that more research is needed.
Who can argue with a call for more research? As
one who regrets the paucity of empirical support for
the generalizations that fill much legal academic work,
I don't want to be a naysayer here. But we ought not
underestimate how far we are from being able to
assess the degree to which S 5Ki.I practice is actually
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undermining sentencing equity.
The Working Group's paper offers dramatic
evidence that § 5K.I practices differ across districts.
The difference between the Eastern District of
Virginia's 3.9% substantial assistance rate for 1994
and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania's 49.3%
DANIEL C.
rate, 3for example, surely has more to do with with
RICHMAN
§ 5KI.I practice than with variation in caseload or
actual cooperation rates. But do these statistics
Associate Professor,
indicate that cooperators rendering similar degrees of
Fordham University School
assistance are treated differently? When I sought an
of Law; Assistant U.S.
explanation of this discrepancy from a source familiar
Attorney, Southern District
with E.D. Pennsylvania practice, I was told that the
of New York, 1987-92.
U.S. attorney's office there was particularly averse to
charge bargaining, that the office believes it has an
inordinate number of significant multidefendant
cases, and that, in any event, the district's judges
seemed to give unusually small discounts to cooperators. When I asked a source familar with E.D. Virginia
practice to explain that district's atypically low rate, his
answer was quick and simple: The judges in that
"rocket docket" district 4 want to sentence cooperators
soon after they plead guilty, and are not keen on
giving the U.S. attorney's office time to call cooperators as witnesses in related cases or otherwise obtain
the benefits of their assistance prior to sentencing.
Prosecutors in that district have adapted by dispensing
with § 5 Ki.i motions at sentencing, and rewarding
cooperation once it has been completed by filing Rule
3 5(b) motions.
Rule 3 5 (b) motions are, of course, not the only
way prosecutors can obtain leniency for cooperators
without filing § 5Ki.i motions. Indeed, the Working
Group's report suggests that only "a few districts...
use Rule 3 5 (b) motions rather than § 5Ki.I departures
as a matter of prosecutorial policy." 5 The far more
common alternative to S 5KI.I practice appears to be
charge bargaining, or sentencing fact bargaining. It is
hardly surprising that, in the U.S. attorneys' offices
visited by the Working Group, the prosecutors in the
one "with the lowest substantial assistance rate of the
districts visited" "regularly engaged in charge
bargaining that allowed defendants to plead to lesser
charges or referred the case to state/local courts for
prosecution." 6
The challenge is for an outsider to figure out
exactly when charge discounts or sentencing fact
discounts are used in lieu of § 5KI.I motions. But this
is the same challenge that has bedeviled all efforts to
investigate the malleability of the guidelines more
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generally, and it is not one that the Commission or
anyone else appears equal to. When a defendant is
arrested with a sum certain of illegally obtained
money or property or an easily ascertainable quantity
of drugs on his person, a review of his case file will
likely indicate whether he received a sentencing
discount in exchange for his cooperation and/or his
guilty plea. Determining the amount of loss or
quantity of narcotics involved in a multi-defendant
fraud or drug conspiracy - the kind of case most
likely to produce cooperators - will generally involve a
far more impressionistic process, however, and one
that is far more amenable to undetectable manipulation. 7 Perhaps reviewing a non-cooperating codefendant's case file will reveal whether special
leniency has been sought; perhaps not. Unless we
rely on the characterization of the Assistant (or
defense counsel) handling the case, we probably will
not be able to tell the difference.
Even if careful attention to the charging practices
of each district enabled us miraculously to identify
those defendants who obtained a sentence reduction
(via 5 5KI.I or some some other route) as a result of
their substantial assistance, we would still want to
determine whether defendants rendering similar
degrees of assistance were receiving comparable
sentence reductions (or recommendations). The
Working Group sought to explore disparities in this
regard, but its presentation contained one critical
caveat: Its multivariant model was unable to consider
the "quality or usefulness" of a cooperator's informa8
tion, testimony, or undercover assistance. The
model thus was not able to distinguish between (i) a
case in which the defendant had provided information
to the government but did not receive a \ 5KI.I
motion because the U.S. attorney's office believed
information "substantial" only when it led to the
indictment of another person, and (2) a case in which
the office's refusal to file the motion was based on the
defendant's lack of candor during debriefings.
I do not fault the Working Group's refusal to
include a factor that it conceded would likely have a
"strong explanatory impact[] on the substantial
assistance process." 9 Indeed, I don't see how it could
have done otherwise. Were the Commission staff to
rely on prosecutorial characterizations of assistance
quality, would it not be ceding much of its fact-finding
mandate to the very line Assistants whose conduct it
was assessing? Just as one prosecutor who uses
5 5KI.I motions to entice recalcitrant defendants into
pleading will blithely attest to their candor, so may his
overly demanding colleague be quick to attribute a
defendant's inability to say more to "disingenuity."
On the other hand, it would be well-nigh impossible
for the Commission to second-guess prosecutorial
assessments in this area.
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Given that the Working Group's understandable
failure to consider assistance quality and value
substantially limits the usefulness of its study, can we
expect further work to cure the problem? I suspect
not. Perhaps I am unduly pessimistic, but I do not see
how even the most diligent investigator can take a
broad range of cases and second-guess line Assistants'
assessments of worth.
This leads to a larger and even more pessimistic
point. Even if the Commission staff were able to
surmount all the methodological challenges and
quantitatively confirm that there are grave disparities
in the way cooperators are treated across districts, it is
far from clear that policy articulation and hierarchical
supervision within each office would solve the
problem. The Working Group makes much of the
need for national standards, and structures to ensure
adherence to them. In the end, however, the line
Assistants whose judgments are supposed to be
monitored will still dominate the S 5K1.I internal
decisionmaking process. This domination is in part a
matter of informational asymmetry: It will often be as
difficult for a U.S. attorney's office's 5 51K. committee to question a line Assistant's assessment of a
cooperator's value and candor as it is for the Commission staff to do so.
Yet there are other factors involved as well. The
decision as to whether a S 5Km motion will be filed
may precede sentencing, but it comes at the end of
what likely was a complicated bargaining process that
began even before the defendant's first proffer.
Although the agreement that typically formalizes the
relationship between a cooperator and the government will ostensibly leave the government with
complete discretion as to whether it will file a S 5KI.I
motion, the development of that relationship will
inevitably be framed by the line Assistant's statements
about her expectations and the degree of her satisfaction with the cooperator's performance. Such
statements will often create legally cognizably reliance
interests, particularly in those circuits that have
imposed a meaningful obligation on the government
°
to exercise its discretion in "good faith."' And even
where the reliance interest is not legally cognizable, it
will still carry weight in an office's deliberations, since
to renege on an Assistant's veiled assurances or
threats is to make it more difficult for her to negotiate in the future, particularly in a small legal community."
So what's wrong with trying to gather more
quantitative evidence about 5 5K.I practices, and
calling for more formal structures to monitor \ 5KI.I
practices within and across U.S. attorneys' offices?
Nothing really, as long as we don't overestimate the
returns on such efforts, or get misled into presuming
that the appearance of horizontal equity in this
I
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extraordinarily fact-sensitive area is anything more
than the invocation of the right code-words by those in
the trenches."
Notes
See, e.g., Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Defendants: The
Costs and Benefits of Purchasing Information from Scoundrels,
8 FED. SENT. R. 292 (1996); Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating
Clients, 56 OHIO ST. L. J. 69 (1995).
2United States Sentencing Commission Substantial
Assistance Staff Working Group, Sentence Reductions Based
on Defendants' Substantial Assistance to the Government, at
146 (1997).
3 Id. at 112-14 (table 12). This variation was not confined to
1994. In 1997, E.D.Pa. had a substantial assistance rate
of 41.8%, compared with 5.8% in E.D.Va. United States
Sentencing Commission, 1997 Sourcebook of Federal
Sentencing Statistics (1998).
See Enrique J. Gonzales, Speed is the Ticket in this Court;
Virginia District Called Fastest for Trials Among 94 in the
Nation, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1989, at B5 ("The U.S. District
Court judges and clerks in the Eastern District of Virginia
move cases so quickly and efficiently that the district is
known as the East Coast's 'rocket docket."').
Substantial Assistance Staff Working Group, Sentence
Reductions, supra note 2, at 116.
6 Id. at 57.

See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 146 F3d 6, 11 (Is' Cir.
1998) (fraud defendant convicted after trial points out that
"loss attributed to her was substantially higher than the
loss attributed to other similarly situated defendants who
had cooperated with the government").
8 Substantial Assistance Staff Working Group, Sentence
Reductions, supra note 2, at 146.
9 Id.
10Id. at 12-15; see, e.g., United States v. Harpaul, Cr. 97-303
(ADS) (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 1998) (after consideration of
submissions ordered in 4 F Supp.2d 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)).
11The interplay between repeat player prosecutors and
defense lawyers in the cooperation system is something I
explore at greater length in my article, Cooperating Clients,
see supra note 1.
12 So long as their limitations are understood, § 5K1.1
committees can at least help ensure some consistency in
the positions that a U.S. attorney's office takes on
cooperator sentences. The use of such committees was
recommended in a recent report of the Justice
Department's Inspector General. See Dept' of Justice,
Office of the Inspector General, CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine
Controversy: A Review of the Justice Department's Investigations and Prosecutions (dated December 1997; released July
1998).
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